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The Human Limits of Science 
Ronald Munson 
One of the favorite themes in classical science fiction concerns an 
encounter with alien beings who possess a science so superior to ours 
that we are literally incapable of understanding it . They are able to 
make discoveries about the universe that are impossible for us either 
because they are more intelligent than we are, or because they live a 
great deal longer, or because they are able to manipulate time and 
space in ways that are a mystery to us. 
I mention these enviable aliens only because in recent years some 
writers have suggested that, even without the aliens for comparison , 
we human beings have characteristics that constitute inescapable res­
trictions on what science can discover about the world. That is, some 
writers have claimed that there are inherent human limitations that, in 
turn , place limits on the concepts and methods of science . As a result, 
we cannot expect science to provide us with explanations of all phen­
omena we regard as puzzling . 
I would like to say at the outset that I don't know whether the gen­
eral thesis that science is (or is likely to be ) restricted by human 
nature is right or wrong, and I am not prepared to offer a decisive 
counterargument against every specific version of it that might be 
offered . Rather , what I wish to do is to provide three construe ls of the 
thesis - three specific versions of it - and examine the reasons that 
can be offered in support of them . 
I shall try to show that the first version of the thesis is demonstra­
bly false and rests on mis understandings about the methods of science 
and what can be established by their use . In the second version , the 
thesis is plausible and may even be true, but it is quite harmless in its 
implications. The third version of the thesis requires that we accept 
contested claims about the nature of the human mind and the charac­
ter of scientific theories. However , even granting these assumptions , I 
want to show that the arguments in favor of the thesis are inadequate 
to establish that it is likely that there are aspects of the world beyond 
the reach of our concepts and theories . 
I make no pretense that these constitute all the arguments that 
could be offered , but they seem to me to represent the most influen­
tial and most common ones . 
1 .  The Argument from Practical Limits 
The first argument I want to talk about is one the 1 8th century would 
have called "vulgar," because to the best of my knowledge , it is 
2
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 17 [1986], No. 1, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol17/iss1/3
44 Ronald M un.ron 
offered exclusively by those who display little sophistication concern­
ing the workings of science. Nevertheless, its immense popular appeal 
and influence make it worthwhile to examine. 
The argument is best appreciated by focusing on the context in 
which it has most recently been offered in public debate. Opponents 
of evolutionary theory, calling themselves creationists or creation 
scientists, frequently charge that we cannot have any scientific know­
ledge about such matters as the origin of species. Science is supposed 
to be based on observations, yet as they charge, " No one has ever 
seen a species evolve. "  
This assertion i s  quite correct, for speciation appears to require a 
time scale of millions ( or at least tens of thousands) of years. Since 
human lives and even human cultures occur on a time scale several 
orders of magnitude shorter, there is no way in which we can witness 
the occurrence of speciation. The argument intended to establish this 
position is put quite succinctly by a defender of creationism in a letter 
to the science magazine Discover: 
Given the scientific methodology of today, . . .  it 
should be obvious to any thinking person that 
evolution is a rheory and a rheory alone, for one 
very good reason. It is a nonreproducible 
hypothesis; no one has ever witnessed evolution 
taking place, and no one ever will since the time 
frame for evolution precludes human 
observation.1 
Quite apart from the creationist perspective, the fact remains that 
there is no way in which we can directly test theories of speciation to 
determine, for example, whether the gradualism of the synthetic the­
ory or the relatively fast tempo of the punctuated equilibrium model 
is correct. Producing species is not like crossbreeding peas, and we 
cannot "witness" it. 
We can generalize from this example, for what is true of speciation 
or evolution in general is also true of other processes that require vast 
amounts of time for their occurrence. New configurations of the tec­
tonic plates, the creation of sandstone, the reversal of the magnetic 
poles of the planet, and the apparent 26 million year cycle of wide­
spread extinctions of biological species are all among those geological 
and biological events we cannot witness. Similarly the increase of 
entropy in our local group, the movement of our galaxy through a 
complete rotation, the formation of planets by the condensation of 
gaseous materials, and the origin of the universe itself are just a few of 
the astronomical occurrences we cannot directly observe. 
To extend this line of argument, we can call attention to the fact 
that there are other kinds of events that require both enormous 
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amounts of time and special circumrances that are beyond our capaci­
ties and capabilities. For example, we cannot study the origin of life 
by constructing a planet and trying out various combinations of chem­
icals under a variety of conditions for a few million years. Nor can we 
solve the problems presented by such an inquiry by travelling back­
wards in time and studying the processes taking place at the beginning 
of our own planet. The paradoxes such a trip would generate would 
violate our fundamental physical theories and make it an impossibil­
ity. We may shatter worlds and destroy life, but we cannot create 
planets and cause life to spring forth from chemical mixtures. 
As these examples illustrate, we are creatures bound by time and 
limited in power. Both the irretrievable past and the distant future, as 
well as our inability to control and construct large-scale conditions, 
deny us direct access to numerous significant events in the natural 
world. In effect, then, our own limitations constitute barriers beyond 
which science cannot proceed. 
For antievolutionists, these "boundaries" mean that the require­
ment that science be based on observation cannot be met, and conse­
quently, all claims about the origin of species or life or the universe 
are basically unscientific. This leaves open a door through which crea­
tionism can walk without opposition. As the letter writer I quoted 
earlier says, "The fact of the matter is that any view of the origins of 
the universe, and the beginning and destiny of man, is based upon a 
faith system. "  
Whether or not one wishes to open the door for creationism, there 
still remains the argument to the effect that our human limitations 
form a roadblock that science cannot get around. More formally 
stated , the argument runs like this: 
( 1 )  Legitimate scientific claims require direct 
observations. 
( 2 )  Events such as the origin of species, the origin 
of life and the universe, the reversal of the 
magnetic poles, and so on cannot be directly 
observed or studied. 
( 3 )  Therefore, claims about them cannot be 
legitimate scientific claims. 
The most obvious and wholly adequate response to this argument is 
to point out that it involves a false premise. The argument assumes 
that all legitimate scientific knowledge requires that we immediately 
or directly study the events that are the objects of our inquiry. But, of 
course, we both can and do establish reliable scientific theories that 
concern events that are remote from us in time or are beyond the 
scope of our power to reproduce. 
Even though we cannot watch speciation taking place before our 
very eyes, for example, we can study changes in populations that we 
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have reason to believe exemplify the sorts of mechanisms involved in 
rhe emergence of new species. (The classic case of such studies is that 
of the increase in the frequency of melanic forms of moths under 
conditions that include a darkening of crucial parts of the environ­
ment by industrial pollution, predation by birds, and an existing low 
frequency of mclanic forms in the initial population.) In the controv­
ersy between rhe classic neo-Darwinian account and the punctuated 
equilibrium model, we also have available for consideration the fossil 
record of a variety of forms, and information about geographical dis-­
tribution, genetic mechanisms, and environmental changes. 
Similarly, we have not seen Pangea broken up by the movement of 
the tectonic plates, but we have evidence of the actions of the plates in 
the occurrence of the event. We cannot create life or fashion new 
planets by exercising godlike powers, but we have managed to acquire 
an experimental and theoretical understanding of the processes likely 
to be involved. Furthermore, although we have not "witnessed" the 
creation of the universe, we have been able to discover signs of its 
beginnings and, together with our physical theories, we can at least 
reconstruct the story of what is likely to have happened. 
Despite appearances, the argument we are examining is not really 
one about the limits of what we can know. At best, it is an argument 
about the limits of certain ways of finding ouc or coming to know. It 
emphasizes the obvious truth that the finite scope of our time and 
powers restricts us in the methods we can employ in investigating cer­
tain sorts of phenomena. In particular, we cannot employ "direct" 
observation or experiment in a number of cases in which it would be 
nice if we were able to do so. We cannot watch species evolve in the 
way in which we watch cells divide or litmus paper change color. 
Yet having to proceed in indirect ways is nothing peculiar within 
science. We can no more "directly" observe the behavior of quantum 
mechanical entities than we can, for very different reasons, observe 
the origin of species. It is part of the cunning of science and of scien­
tists to be able to solve the empirical problems of the world on the 
basis of the most feeble clues. The constraints on time and experi­
ments surely constitute barriers, but just as surely, they do not consti­
tute inescapable limits. 
2. The Argument from the Insufficiency of Brain Hardware 
The second argument I want to examine is one presented by Carl 
Sagan, although not endorsed by him. The argument resembles in its 
line of reasoning suggestions made by some writers on brain 
physiology. 2 
The basic notion underlying the argument is that the size and struc­
ture of the human brain are such that they constitute limits on the 
quantity of information that the brain can store. If we assume that the 
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brain contains as many as 10 1 1  neurons, that each neuron has a thou­
sand dendrites, and that a bit of i nformation can be represented by a 
single connection of one dendrite with another, then ( in Sagan's 
words ) • •the total number of things knowable by the brain is no more 
than 10 1 4 ." 3  Given this limit on the capacity of the brain to store 
information, it follows that if the things to be known in the universe 
exceed the capacity, then we simply cannot know them all. 
It is easy to show that there is such a barrier to our knowledge. 
Indeed, it is possible to show that we cannot know fully even a single 
grain of salt. A grain of salt - a microgram - contains by our best 
estimates about 101 6  sodium atoms. To know everything about the 
grain would require, at the very least, knowing the location of each of 
the atoms in the three-dimensional array. But the i nformation 
required for this exceeds by two orders of magnitude the information 
capacity of the brain. In a real sense, then, we cannot even k now all 
there is to know about a single grain of salt. 
Given that the universe itself contains as many as 1()80 elementary 
particles, it is obvious that it is impossible for us to k now each of 
them. The hardware of our brains thus restricts what we can k now of 
the world . All our knowledge must, perforce, be partial and incom­
plete. If we cannot fully k now even a grain of salt, then a fortiori, we 
cannot know the universe. Since human science is dependent on the 
human brain, the physical limits of our brain also constitute a limit on 
science. 
Several responses to this argument are possible. We could challenge 
the factual premises and suggest that the assumption of 101 1 neurons 
as a measure of brain size is too small a number. Or we could take 
issue with the assumption that a connection of one dendrite with 
another is required to store a single bit of information. There is good 
reason to believe that information storage in the brain is not in accord 
with such a simple wired-up model and some other more appropriate 
model (a field-type, for example ) might provide more potential capac­
ity for storage. 
This line of criticism is not likely to be effective. Whatever reason­
able number of neurons is assumed and whatever model for encoded 
storage is assumed, we will still be left with the undeniable fact that 
there are differences amounting to orders of magnitude between what 
the brain can store and the ufacts" there are to know. It would not be 
enough, for example, to show that the brain could know a grain of 
salt. That would still leave everything else in the universe unknowable 
in the required sense. 
A second response to the argument is to point out that it assumes 
that a radical form of what Russell called knowledge by acquaintance 
is the only legitimate kind of knowledge. The argument is phrased in 
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such a way that to know something requires something like a one-to­
one correspondence between what is known and how it is represented 
in the brain. It seems that we must be able, in effect, to reproduce a 
simulacrum of what is known. At least, the information specifying the 
object k nown must be represented by some brain state. 
But, of course, we know char a microgram of salt contains about 
10 16 atoms without performing an impossible feat. Knowing this fact 
in no way entails that we have somehow been able to encode the 
structure of the array of atoms in the salt crystal .  Th us, we can 
respond to the argument by pointing out that it has too narrowly 
construed the requirements for knowing something. 
Besides, even if we accepted the notion that to know something 
requires encoding information that would allow us to represent the 
object k nown, we need not agree that the representation must be one­
to-one, that the representation must be a simulacrum. The positions 
of the atoms in a crystal of salt are boringly invariant - sodium is 
attached to chlorine, which is attached to another chlorine, which is 
attached to another sodium, and so on. One line of atoms is just like 
the line above it and the line below it. Because of this, as Sagan points 
out, "An absolutely pure crystal of salt could have the position of 
every atom specified by something like 10 bits of information. "  There 
is no difficulty, then, in the brain "knowing" a grain of salt. 
This response to the argument is both reasonable and appropriate. 
However,  it is a response and not a refutation. The response reminds 
us that we should not think that there is no way in which we can know 
a grain of salt, for there surely is. Similarly, we should not conclude 
that there is no way in which we can know the universe and its 
furniture. 
The argument itself, I think, is left unscathed both by this response 
and by the first response we considered. We can disagree about how 
much information the brain can store and about how it stores it. We 
can point out that we can dramatically increase our information stor­
age abilities by employing a large number of brains, books, and com­
puters. But after all of this has been said, the fact will remain that we 
will lack the capacity to know 1 ()80  elementary particles, all of their 
configurations, and all of the objects and the relationships at the var­
ious levels of physical organization that involve the elementary 
particles. 
In sum, I believe that the argument is basically correct and that 
there is an upper limit to the amount of information that, individually 
or collectively, our brains can store. I believe that it is even correct to 
say, in the argument 's sense , that we cannot k now a mere grain of salt. 
This limit on information storage does constitute a limit on science. 
However, such a limit is hardly a cause for despair. Even if it is true 
that we are not capable of knowing ( being acquainted with ) literally 
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everything that we might potentially find out about a grain of salt or 
the entire universe, nothing of any significance follows from this. The 
argument gets its shock value only because it assigns a special and 
quite out of the ordinary sense to the word l tknow. "  
What we really want to know and what w e  look to science to pro­
vide are the basic pri nciples and theories that supply the patterns and 
connections that make sense out of the almost limitless number of 
particulars that form the universe and its fu rnishings. We cannot 
know all the particulars. This much we can concede to the argument. 
What we need not concede is that this makes a significant difference 
to the development of science. Our brains are finite and the informa­
tion they can handle is thus also finite. But the amount of information 
it is possible for the brain to store is so large that the existence of a 
theoretical limit has (for all practical purposes ) no consequences. We 
need not be bothered by it any more than we need to worry about 
approaching the speed of light and acquiring infi nite mass while riding 
a bicycle. 
3. The Argument from Mental Architecture 
The third defense of the limits thesis is one based on a general evolu­
tionary approach to the understanding of human abilities and cogni­
tive capacities. Both Noam Chomsky and Jerry Fodor claim that the 
architecture of the human mind places limits on our cognitive abilities 
and that these limits make it likely that we are not suited to solve all 
the problems that a scientific understanding of the world may require. 
Later I want to state this argument more formally, but let me begin 
by presenting some of the details offered by Chomsky and Fodor to 
make their position plausible. 
For Chomsky, one of the primary reasons for studying language is 
that by doing so "we may hope to gain some understanding of the 
specific characteristics of human intelligence" and .. discover abstract 
principles that govern its structure and use, principles that are univer­
sal by biological necessity and not mere historical accident, that derive 
from mental characteristics of the species. "4 
Thus, language, for Chomsky, offers us clues about our mental 
architecture. But language is only an instance of our intellectual capac­
ities. More generally, according to Chomsky, all that we say we know 
and all that we come to believe is dependent upon experiences that 
"evoke in us some part of the cognitive system that is latent in the 
mind . "5 This means, then, that "our systems of belief are those that 
the mind, as a biological structure, is designed to construct. '6 
Chomsky is quite explicit in pointing out that the innate biological 
principles (whatever they may be ) that have permitted us to make 
scientific discoveries are also ones that must "sharply constrain the 
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class of h umanly accessible sciences . . , - After a l l ,  Chomsky write . 
"There is surely no evol utionary pressure that leads humans ta ha\·e 
minds capable of discovering significant explanatory theories in spe­
cific fields of inqui ry ."  Indeed , Chomsky suggests that we should 
consider ourselves fortunate that we have done as well as we ha\·e. for 
' ' it is  only a lucky accident if  [ our mind's] cognitive capacity happens 
to be well matched to scientific truth in some area." 
In short, Chomsk y seems to believe that our minds have been 
formed by evolutionary factors that suit us for escaping from maraud­
ing lions and for hu nting down our di nner but not for inventing or 
discovering whatever concepts we may need in order to grasp the hid­
den mechanisms that operate the world. In performing this later task . 
he must admit, we have met with some degree of success, but this 
success he attributes to a " l ucky accident ."  
For Chomsky ,  the restricted character of  the h uman intellect, of 
human cognitive capacity,  has an explanatory power. It explains, he 
says, why it is that "there are so few sciences and that so much of 
human i nquiry fails to atta in any intellectual depth . " 1 0  If we had a bet­
ter understanding of h uman cognitive capacity, then we might be able 
to determine "the c lass of humanly accessible sciences, " 1 1  and these 
might turn out to be only "a small subset of those potential scien­
ces" '  2 that deal with aspects of the world that we would like to 
understa nd. 
Presumably, a better understanding of the princi ples of our mental 
architecture might permit us to determine, for example, whether we 
can ever expect to solve the mind-body problem or ever establish a 
comprehensive science of society. As to exactly how a knowledge of 
our cognitive capacities might enable us to make such determinations, 
Chomsky is silent . 1 3  
Chomsky also endorses a realistic notion of theories and a corres­
pondence view of truth. Explanatory theories or sciences, according 
to Chomsky,  can be developed by humans if and only if "something 
close to the true theory in a certain domai n happens to fal l  within 
human ' science forming' capacities. " 1 4  Thus, we are invited to think 
of principles, theories, or sciences as existing independently of us and 
as being, as it were, implicit within phenomena . It is the task of 
science as an enterprise to formulate explicit theories that may or may 
not capture the true, implicit theories. 
Science req uires empirical i nquiry, of course, but whether that 
i nquiry has even the possibility of success depends ultima tely  on 
human "science forming" capacities with respect to the domain of 
i nquiry. In some domains, as I read Chomsky ,  try as we may,  we 
might not ever be able to formulate " the true theory" of the domain . 
It will  elude our conceptual grasp for much the same reasons that an 
understa nding of the calculus will alwa ys elude the housecat. In both 
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cases , cognitive capacities will simpl • be inadequate to perform the 
casks required . Our theories will be successful when there is a match 
berwen them and the real entities and relationships in the domain of 
inquir 1• As Chomsk writes , " We anain knowledge when the 'inward 
ideas of the mind itself' and the structures it creates conform to the 
nature of things . " 1 5  
Chomsky 's claim that the architecture of the human mind places 
limits on scientific inquiry is one also accepted by Fodor . Although 
the terms he uses in talking about cognitive capacities are somewhat 
different, he argues for the limits view along essentially similar lines . 
Like Chomsky, Fodor rejects the notion that human cognitive capaci, 
ties are general or unspecialized . In his terminology he denies that 
intelligence is ''horizontal" or "non,modular . "  Instead, again like 
Chomsky , Fodor opts for a "vertical " or "modular " theory of intelli, 
gence, according to which the architecture of the mind is a collection 
of special,purpose mechanisms or "mental organs . "  These mental 
organs are, presumably, the result of the operation of natural selec, 
tion 's fitting us to deal with the wor ld of ordinary experience , 
although Fodor does not emphasize this as Chomsky does. 
Granted that our mental architecture is modular , that we possess 
only special,purpose "mental organs ," then it follows that our minds 
are capable of solving only problems with a certain kind of structure . 
(To. offer an analogy, we would not expect a machine capable only of 
adding to be able to solve a differential equation . The machine can 
solve only problems with a certain structure , namely addition prob, 
lems . )  If our minds are collections of special purpose mechanisms , 
then , Fodor says, "it is surely in the cards that there should be some 
problems whose structure the mind has no computational resources 
for coping with. " 1 6 
Fodor does not let matters rest with the statement that there are 
sure to be some problems our minds are unable to solve. He goes on 
to claim that one of those problems might be "the true theory of the 
structure of the worl d. " As Fodor writes : 
... it is entirely compatible with modularity the, 
ory that there should be endogenously determined 
constraints on our mental capacities such that the 
best science - the true theory of the structure of 
the world - is not one of the theories that we are 
capable of entertaining. 1 7 
If I read this correctly, this means that in Fodor's view it is possible 
that we do not have , and never will have, "the best science. "  That is , 
it is possible that the architecture of our minds is such that even our 
current best theories , ones that we believe to be true , do not actually 
provide us with an understanding of the worl d,  for if we could only 
grasp "the true theory of the structure of the worl d "  we could see 
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their faults and deficiencies. Indeed, it is possible that "e are forever 
doomed to be stuck with second-race 1ence ac mosc. for "the best 
science" lies beyond rhe power of our cognitive capacities. 
As 1 mentioned earlier , except for terminology and a focus on dif­
ferent details, Chomsky and Fodor argue for the lim its view along 
essentia lly similar li nes. What I rake to be the basic position of both 
can be represented and summanzed in a more formal fashion by the 
fol lowing argument: 
( 1 )  Cognitive functioning ( the mind, intelligence, thinking) is either 
modular ( involves specialized mechanisms or mental organs ) or non­
modular ( is general and unspecialized ) .  
( 2 )  Evidence from evolution ( l inguistics, animal studies, etc . )  sup­
ports a modular theory. In partic ular, it supports a theory according 
to which our mental architecture has been shaped by selection pres­
sures adapting us to deal with the world of ordinary experience. 
( 3 )  If a modular theory is correct then i ntelligence is epistemically 
bounded. 
( 4) If intelligence is epistemically bounded and has been shaped by 
selection pressures. to deal with ordinary experience, then it is li kely 
( "surely in the cards " )  that there are scientific problems the mind 
can not solve or scientific theories ( "true theories ,"  "sciences " )  the 
mind cannot grasp, for much of science lies outside the sphere of 
ordinary experience. 
We might deal with this argument by challenging the premise that a 
modular theory of mind is the correct type of account for human 
intell igence. This would embroil us in the question of the adequacy of psychological theories, and at the moment, this is not a question that 
can be decisively settled. Besides, I thing it is fair to say that a modu­
lar theory does seem to be the odds-on favorite for accounting for our 
mental architecture. 
Agreeing on this point does not mean agreeing that Chomsky and 
Fodor have adequately established the claim that our cognitive func­
tioning makes it likely that there are scientific theories we will never 
be able to establish, "sciences" that we will never be able to develop. 
For example, the general l ine of argument can be successful only when 
it is offered in conjunction with Chomsky's and Fodor's realistic view 
of theories and correspondence notion of truth . We must believe that 
there are true theories (or one true theory ) implicit (as it were ) in the 
phenomena of the world that we must discover, and we k now that the 
theories we formulate are correct when , as Chomsky says, they "con­
form to the nature of things. " 1 8  Only the realistic view makes it posi­
ble to say that there are true theories beyond our conceptual compe­
tence and many philosophers would simply reject realism as an 
adequate account of the aims and structure of science and deny that 
scientific theories are attempts to provide us with the one true des-
11
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cription of the facts of the world. By viewing theories pragmatically. 
for example, and making empirical adequacy as determined by obser­
vations the standard of acceptability , some philosphers would simply 
dissolve the grounds for arguing for epistemic boundedness. 
Taking this approach would involve us in the complex dispute 
between realism and antirealism. A better approach to evaluating the 
Chomsky- Fodor position, I believe, is to grant them their assump-­
tions and show that, even so, they have not adquately established 
their conclusion that it is likely or .. in the cards'' that the modular 
character of our minds or "innate biological principles' '  place con­
straints on science's attempt to understand the world. This is what I 
would now like to attempt to do. 
Chomsky is undeniably correct in claiming that our brain and its 
cognitive capacities have been shaped by evolutionary forces operating 
in the ordinary world. Predators and prey, heat and cold , fight and 
flight, sex and reproduction, tools and weapons, and so on are all 
matters far removed from those dealt with by quantum mechanics, 
relativistic physics, and even evolutionary biology itself. Who could 
have guessed, given our evolutionary history, that we would be able to 
invent (or discover ) the concepts and theories needed to understand 
events so alien to us as hadron production, Riemannian space, and the 
Kreb's cycle? 
Gµnther Stent may be right in saying that some of the difficulty we 
have in dealing with physical theory, in particular, may be attributed 
to the fact that evolution did not select for j ust the capacities 
required . 19 Hence, what we now do with pain and effort we can 
imagine doing more easily, if only our evolutionary history had been 
different. Perhaps if it had been different i n  j ust the right ways, our 
basic physical theories would not seem puzzling and even counterin­
tuitive. We would have the right sort of " feel" for them, in the same 
sort of way that some people have a knack for writing jokes. 
However, notice that, despite the counterintuitive character of these 
theories, we were able to formulate them and use them to acquire an 
understanding of the processes that constitute their domain. I believe 
it is fair to say that, as it turned out, our brains are fit to deal with 
even relativistic and quantum mechanical phenomena . Our cognitive 
capacities are adequate for grasping the processes and events we pres­
ently consider basic. We may have reached understanding the hard 
way, but we did reach it. ( That we still have further to go towards 
understanding does not alter the fact that we have come as far as we 
have . )  
Yet we have little reason to believe that just because our brains were 
shaped by evolution, there are aspects of the world that science ( as 
made by us) will be incapable of comprehending. Since there were 
apparently no selection pressures favoring our capacities to under-
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stand calculus or measure the charge of an electron, Chomsky refers 
to these abiHties as "lucky accidents. "  We are j ust fortunate that our 
brains work in ways that have permitted us to get as fa r along the 
scientific path as we have, and we might not be so fortunate where 
other matters are concerned. Yet Chomsky has no real argument for 
this claim. The evolution of the human brain remains one of the big 
mysteries of physical anthropology, and we really do not understand 
what the selection pressures were. The brain certainly seems to exceed 
in power the needs of our human ancestors, and that anomaly is one 
of the facts that make an evolutionary account of the brain so 
difficult. 
lt is obvious, to be sure, that making measurements in particle 
physics was not among the selection pressures that shaped the brain. 
To this extent, Chomsky may be correct in saying that an ability to 
make them or to perform the other tasks required by the developed 
sciences is a lucky accident. However, granted that we have such cog­
nitive capacities, it does not follow that the capacity to understand 
whatever else we may wish to understand will also be a special kind of 
luck.  It may be that we were j ust lucky one rime but in a major way 
and that we have the cognitive capacity to do all that science requires 
that we do. 
Let me put the point another way. Even granting that Chomsky and 
Fodor are right and that there are epistemic limits, it may be thr : they 
are so remote ( that our sphere of competence is so large) that we will 
never encounter them. It may be that everything that we will ever 
want to know we will be able to know. It may be that we possess the 
intelligence we need to understand the world. 
There is, to be sure, the possibility that we are in the position of an 
ant that never encounters the geographical limits of the planet, 
although they are real enough. It may be that there are true theories 
that we are unable to grasp, but it may also be that this makes no dif­
ference in our efforts to acquire a scientific understanding of the 
world. Both states of affairs are possibilities. 
A philosophical dictum that has become a commonplace since Wit­
tgenstein is that there is no way in which we can know both sides of a 
boundary. We simply do not know what it is that ( perhaps) we are 
unable to know, what we perhaps lack the cognitive capacity to know. 
That is, if there is an epistemic boundary, then we cannot say what 
lies on the other side. If we repeatedly fail to solve certain kinds of 
problems, then we may begin to suspect this is because we are not 
able to invent or grasp the concepts needed. But there is no way for us 
to be sure of this. It may be, instead, that we merely have not yet 
come up with the needed concepts, although we are potentially capa­
ble of doing so. On the contrary, the boundary may be very genuine, 
and it may stand as an impenetrable barrier to what we need to know 
13
Munson: The Human Limits of Science
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1986
The Human L1m1ts of Scienc� 55 
about the universe and its furniture. That too, is a possibility. 
What Chomsky and Fodor surely have not demonstrated, even 
granting them their arguments and assumptions, is that "it is surely i n  
the cards" that there are scientific problems beyond our powers to 
solve. What they have demonstrated, at most, is that it is at least pos­
sible that we will never be able to achieve a true understanding of the 
world and that one possible source of this possible i nability is that we 
are not able to grasp the concepts needed . 
This is a conclusion that seems to me wholly unobjectionable. le 
also seems to me to be a conclusion wholly without any consequences 
for the development of science or the conduct of scientific inquiry. 
Nor, I think, does the conclusion have the explanatory power that 
Chomsky seems to think it has. Our failure to make any headway in 
the development of some of the sciences may indeed be due to our 
failure to grasp the concepts required. However, as I mentioned 
above, we have no way of knowing whether this is so in any particular 
case. The demonstration that there are limits, even if we grant its cor­
rectness, is virtually useless without k nowing where the limits are. The 
mere possibility of failure may be discouraging, but it is i nadequate to 
explain why we have not been outstandingly successful i n  the devel­
opment of the social sciences or i n  solving the myriad problems that 
still remain open to inquiry. 
Conclusion 
The three arguments that I have examined are all attempts to demon­
strate that human characteristics place restrictions on what can be 
known by science. They are all attempts to show that certain things 
are not possible, or , i n  the case of the third argument, are not likely to 
be possible. In this respect, the arguments resemble a number of well­
known demonstrations in mathematics and the sciences. 
For example, no serious mathematician now believes that it is pos­
sible to construct a square exactly equal in area to a given circle using 
only a compass and a straightedge. In 1 882 the German mathemati­
cian Lindemann demonstrated that it was impossible to "square the 
circle" i n  this way, even though for hundreds of years mathematicians 
had made the attempt. Similarly, no well-informed physicist believes 
that a perpetual motion machine can be constructed nor that we 
might be able to design a spacecraft to travel faster than the speed of 
light. 
The arguments that lie behind these conclusions are based on fun­
damental mathematical and physical principles and are so compelling 
that only poorly-informed cranks continue the effort to do what 
surely cannot be done. Such demonstrations play an important role i n  
the economy o f  scientific research. Problems regarded as potentially 
soluable can become the focus of effort and those that cannot be 
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solved, even in principle, can be set aside as pointless exercises. Thus, 
an immense amount of scientific labor and resources are saved. 
Furthermore, the arguments, even with their negative conclusions, 
call attention to certain fundamental features of the world. Circles 
cannot be squared, and angles cannot be trisected. Every mechanical 
system eventually succumbs to entropy, and the speed of light is a 
limit we may approach, or even match, but not surpass. 
The three arguments I have considered resemble only superficially 
the well-lc nown demonstrations that have influenced the practice of 
science and mathematics. Each of the arguments is seriously flawed, 
and none of them compels us to alter our ideas about what it is possi­
ble for science to accomplish. 
The first argument would have us beleive that no legitimate scien­
tific claims can be made about events that occurred in the remote past 
or that require geological periods of time or the control of great for­
ces. However, as we have seen, the argument rests on a fa lse premise. 
We do, in fact, possess adequate means of establishing claims about 
processes that we cannot directly wimess. 
The second argument would have us believe that it is impossible for 
us to acquire complete knowledge about the world or , indeed, even a 
small fraction of it. This claim is surprising only because we are 
invited to give a plain reading to I Cknowledge" and interpret it in some 
ordinary sense, whereas in fact the argument rests on some special 
sense. In that special sense, it does seem true that we cannot come to 
know the world completel y ,  and in this respect, the second argument 
resembles the classical demonstrations of impossibility. However, the 
special sense of I Cknow" employed in the argument renders a conclu­
sion that is fundamentally trivial .  In this way, the second argument is 
quite unlike the classical demonstrations. 
The third argument would have us believe that it is likely that the 
structure of the human mind makes it impossible for us to produce 
the concepts and theories we need to understand significant aspects of 
the world . The argument is erected on a tower of shaky assumptions, 
but even granting those assumptions, quite unlike the classical dem­
onstrations of impossibility, the third argument is far from compell­
ing. Indeed, it is hardly more than a fascinating bit of speculation 
about why it is that some parts of the world may remain opaque to us 
- if it should turn out that they do remain opaque to us. Despite its 
reliance upon evolutionary theory and the cognitive sciences, the third 
argument is hardly more than an elaborate restatement of the old 
science fiction notion of aliens who understand the world better than 
we shall ever be able to, because they are more intelligent than we are. 
I want to say again that I do not know whether there are limits 
imposed by human nature that make it impossible for us to acquire a 
scientific understanding of the world. However, I am quite sure that 
the three arguments I have considered do not demonstrate the exist-
15
Munson: The Human Limits of Science
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1986
The Human Limits of Science 5 7 
ance of any genuine restrictions. Science is not free to invest resources 
in building a perpetual morion machine or in attempting to square the 
circle. But it is free to continue to investigate the origin of the uni­
verse , the evolution of species, the contents of the universe, and even 
the mind-body problem. 
Perhaps if we are really lucky we will someday meet some of tho.se 
aliens who have already solved these problems and save ourselves a 
great deal of rime and effort. 
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You Can Say That Again 
Stephen E .  Braude 
In this paper I shall address what strike me as a numer of related con­
fusions in the philosophy of language and logic. Although the discus­
sion will center around a certain analysis of tenses, what is more fun­
damentally at issue are widely-held views about meaning and the 
nature of agreement and disagreement. 
Consider the following puzzle. Most philosophers readily assume 
that 
( i )  Necessarily , sentences having different truth­
conditions express different propositions 
and also that 
( i i )  The truth-conditions of a tensed sentence are 
relativized to its time of production 
If ( i )  and ( ii )  are true, however, then it would seem as if a tensed sent­
enc.e produced at different times can never express the same proposi­
tion. But pre-theoretically, it seems obvious that the same tensed 
sentence (e.g. ,  'J .F.K. was assassinated, ) can, on different occasions, 
express (or mean ) the same thing. Hence, in some important sense of 
the term ' proposition' ,  it seems obvious that 
( ii i)  Sometimes, nonsimultaneous occurrences of a 
tensed sentence express the same proposition 
How should we deal with the apparent inconsistency in ( i )-( iii )? 
Part of what l shall argue is that as long as we want to understand 
how a real living language works, then the first statement in this triad 
should be rejected. Moreover, we shall also have to reconsider 
seriously a number of received ideas in the philosophy of language 
and logic. Specifically, I think we shall have to reject the view that 
( iv )  Tenses refer to times 
and also possibly that 
( v )  Propositions have truth-values. 
Furthermore, and perhaps most controversially, I believe that, if we 
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are ever to have a satisfactory understanding of natural languages, we 
will have to accept rwo related claims: 
( vi )  Sentences expressing the same proposition 
can have different truth-values 
( vii) Contradictory sentences can have the same 
truth-value. 
I 
For simplicity, let us consider only well-formed declarative sentence­
events ( tokens) tbe sentences. In other words, let us take a sentence to 
be an instance of a concatenation of morphemes, having truth­
conditions. The visual or auditory pattern of a sentence may (of 
course) be replicated, and let us think of a sentence and its replicas as 
instances of the same string of morphemes. Although I prefer here to 
regard sentences as events or tokens rather than types, I may occa­
sionally appear to treat sentences as types, as when I say that a sent­
ence has different truth-values or expresses different propositions at 
different times. This is merely a short cut for saying that a sentence 
and its replicas do not all have the same truth-conditions or express 
the same proposition. 
Of more central importance to this discussion is the notion of a 
proposition. But here, matters are more complicated. One aim of this 
paper is to address the question: What do sentences express? Let us 
agree that sentences do express things ( have meaning), and let us take 
our task to be that of determining what these things are. Moreover, 
since philosophers typically use the term 'proposition' to designate 
what a sentence expresses ( or can be used to express), it would be 
natural to rephrase our question as follows: What are propositions 
like? But I want to consider how to answer that question with an eye 
to the inconsistent triad above, and at this stage in the game it would 
be improper to answer it by appealing to any familiar view of proposi­
tions, much less the received view according to which statements ( i )  
and ( v )  above are true. After all, it is this received view i n  particular 
that I want to call into question. I suggest, therefore, that we try ( as 
much as possible) to return to a state of philosophical innocence and 
proceed as though there had never been a theory of propositions. 
Beginning afresh in this way, we will be forced to look at language use 
- and not the pronouncements of philosophers - for clues as to the 
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nature of what sentences express. ln fact, I shall henceforth avoid, 
when possible and appropriate, the term 'proposition', and simply say 
that sentences express chings. Hopefully. this will help us to clarify our 
intutions about what sentences express, by distancing us from a famil­
iar theoretical framework. It should also enable us better to under­
stand what it is for users of a natural language to agree or disagree with 
one another. 
But now that we are starting from scratch, so to speak, we can see 
one reason why I regard statement (i) in the original inconsistent triad 
as the most dispensable of the three. To begin with, statement (iii) is a 
fundamental pre-theoretic truth about language use, one which any 
theory of language must be compatible with. Although it contains the 
provisionally dreaded theoretical term 'proposition', ( iii) merely cap­
tures the ordinary language-user's intuition that successive replicas of 
a sentence can express the same thing. For example, when I say 
( l ) J. F. K. was assassinated 
I (or someone else) can later express what I earlier expressed by repli­
cating ( l ). Moreover, in some cases replicas of a tensed sentence pro­
duced many years apart can express the same thing - for example, 
( 1 )  produced now and 5 centuries hence. Among other things, this is 
how historians of different epochs can make the same observations 
abou� the past. 
Even less controversial is statement (ii), which is simply an abbre­
viated definition of 'tensed sentence'. It captures the feature of a cer­
tain class of sentences that sets members of that class apart from such 
expressions as '7 is a prime number', '2  + 2 = 4', and 'all bachelors 
are unmarried'. The timelessness of these latter sentences, as I have 
argued elsewhere ( Braude, 1 97 3 ), is best understood in terms of the 
invariance of their truth-conditions over time. 
Moreover, not only are ( ii) and { iii) antecedently plausible and rela­
tively non-theoretical, they are also empirically supportable. One rea­
son we know (ii) to be true is that we know how language-users assign 
truth-values to tensed sentences, and we know that such assignments 
depend on when, relative to those sentences' times of production, 
what is said to occur in fact occurs. And we know that (iii) is true, 
first of all, because language-users believe themselves able to re­
express what they or others have previously expressed, either with dif­
ferent sentences or by replicating the sentence( s) used earlier. To sup­
pose that one is never correct in such beliefs is simply to confuse 
speaking a natural language with some more esoteric form of linguistic 
activity. Furthermore, if { iii) were false, if we could never re-express 
what we or others expressed previously by replicating the sentences 
used earlier , then our natural languages would not serve the urgent 
human needs that motivated their development in the first place, and 
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they would not be usable by small children and idiots ( see Braude, 
1 976). 
Statement ( i ), by contrast is wholly theoretical and non-empirical ; 
it is a component of a philosophical theory of language. But the 
adeq uacy of any theory of language, I submit, depends in part on 
whether it is compatiable with (i i i ) .  On the surface, of course, it 
appears that ( i )  and ( ii i)  are blatantly incompatible, given the truth of 
( ii ) . And as I shall argue below, the maneuvers required to reconcile 
( i )  and ( i ii ) involve adjustments to ( iv) which are far from convincing. 
In fact,  a misguided allegiance to ( i v )  may lie at the root of the whole 
problem. 
[I 
One reason those who accept 
( ii )  The truth-conditions of a tensed sentence are 
relativized to its time of production 
are incli ned to accept 
( i )  Necessarily sentences having different truth­
conditions express different propositions 
is that in addition to ( ii )  they also accept 
( iv) Tenses refer to times. 
The idea behind ( iv) is that the indexicality of tenses is reflected in 
what a tensed sentence expresses, j ust as the indexicality of the 
personal pronoun is reflected in what ' I  am hungry' expresses ( for 
example, as produced by different people). Many philosophers 
maintain that an ordinary tensed sentence without an explicit 
temporal demonstrative contains a reference to a certain time or 
times, simply in virtue of being tensed. For example, what 1S is now 
O' expresses through the use of the demonstrative ' now' , 1S is 0' is 
supposed to express simply in virtue of being in the present tense. 
That is why the demonstrative in the former sentence is regarded as 
superfluous; 'S is 0' is already supposed to contain a reference to the 
present. Similarly, the past and future-tense sentences 'S was 0' and 
1S will be 0' are supposed to contain references respectively, to times 
before and after the present, even though they contain no explicit 
singular terms referring to those times. 
Various systems of tense logic display their allegiance to 
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this general approach to tenses by defining tense operators in terms of 
a chronological logic, such as Prior-type UT -calculus ( see, e.g. , Prior, 
1967,  1 968; also Rescher and Urquhart, 1 97 1  ). For example, where 
' Uab' is 'instant a is earlier than instant b\ 'TaA ' is 'formula A is true 
at instant a' ,  and where 'n' is a constant for 'now', the past-tense 'PA' 
(to be read, 'it was the case that A') is often defined as '(3t) (Um & 
TtA )'. 
If we ask 'What is the present to which a tensed sentence implicitly 
refers?', a natural first answer might be to expand (iv) as follows. 
(iv') The tense of a sentence refers to an interval 
coterminous with the sentence's time of 
production. 
But then we can see why it would be difficult from this perspective to 
explain how replicas of 
( 1 )  J .F.K. was assassinated 
(2 ) Jones is feding tired 
produced at c, can express the same thing as replicas produced later at 
c'. For example, at c , (2 ) would express whatever is expressed by the 
presumably tenseless sentence 
(2' ) Jones (is] feeling tired at t 
while at t ' it would be equivalent instead to 
(2 .. ) Jones (is] feeling tired at c' . 
Some have endeavored to sidestep this problem by arguing that the 
tense of a sentence refers to more than the sentence's time of produc­
tion. Specifically, they would amend { iv') to read 
(iv .. ) The tense of a sentence refers to the senten­
ce's specious presenc 
A sentence's specious present is a variable interval; its length, or 
extremities relative to a sentence's time of production, may change 
from one context to another. Hence, a sentence's specious present 
may be a short interval on one occasion and a long interval on 
another. Moreover, on some occa.5ions the specious present for a 
sentence may lie mostly in that sentence's future (or past) ,  while on 
other occasions it may extend equally into the sentence's past and 
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future. Bur given that the specious present for a tensed sentence vanes 
in these ways, nonsimultaneous replicas of a tensed sentence can con­
tain references co the same specious present, an interval including all  
the times of production of those replicas. And since successive repli­
cas of a tensed sentence can contain references to the same specious 
present, those replicas can express the same thing, despite being pro­
duced at different times. 
Tyler Burge has advanced a sophisticated and provocative version 
of this view (see Burge, 1974 ). He observes that a sentence like 
( 3 )  My body is too weak for dancing 
can be used appropriately as an answer not only to the question 'Why 
aren 'c you dancing?', but also t0 'Why didn 'c you attend the dance las1 
momh?'. This suggests to Burge that the interval referred to in ( 3 )  as 
the present can vary from replica to replica. In answer tO the first 
question, that interval might be considered relatively short - say, 
that evening (the speaker might just have given blood ). Bur in answer 
to the second question, the interval referred to as the present extends 
into the previous month. Moreover, since we are presumably free to 
choose any interval we like as the present, Burge believes we can 
choose the same interval at different times and thereby express the 
same proposition with nonsimultaneous replicas of a tensed sentence. 
In my view, however, allegiance to (iv) only makes it more difficult 
to understand how nonsimultaneous replicas of a tensed sentence 
could express the same proposition. Consider, for example, replicas 
of 
( 4) Plato is buried in Athens 
produced now and shortly after Plato's death. On the view under con, 
sideration, if these temporally remote replicas of ( 4) express the same 
thing, it is because they contain references to the same specious pres, 
ent. But how does it happen that the speakers of these replicas con, 
sider the same interval to be the present? How, in fact, does a speaker 
select a specious present for his tensed sentences? Are we to suppose, 
for example, that the producer of ( 4 )  in antiquity regarded the present 
for that sentence as a period extending more than 2 ,000 years into the 
future? Would it be impossible for us now to express with ( 4 )  what 
that sentence .expressed after Plato's death, if the ancient speaker con, 
sidered the present to extend only to 1 968? 
The problem with using (ivH) to resolve the apparent inconsistency 
in ( i )-(iii) is that it presupposes a bizarre picture of language use. In 
order to explain how nonsimultaneous tensed sentences can express 
the same thing, it must endow speakers of a natural language with 
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extraordinary good luck and a preposterous historical perspective. For 
me to express the same thing with a tensed sentence as earlier (or 
later) speakers express with their replicas, not only must I regard the 
specious present for my sentence as sufficiently extensive to include 
those other times, but the producers of the other replicas must regard 
the present for their sentences as the same interval I take to be the 
present. Now of course we do not know the entire history (including 
the future history) of language use. Hence, we do not know, at the 
time of speaking, when earlier or Later replicas of our sentences are 
produced, or when producers of that (or other) sentences express 
what we are expressing. And since we do not, as a rule, communicate 
with each other about our choice of specious presents, we certainly do 
not know what speakers of those other sentences take to be the spe­
cious present. But then if (iv"') is true, whether or not nonsimultane, 
ous tensed sentences express the same thing is completely fortuitous. 
But of course it is not fortuitous; in fact, a natural language would be 
a total failure if it were. 
Besides, it is perfectly clear that considerations concerning the 
length of specious presents do not intrude on our use of ordinary 
tensed sentences. For example, in saying 
( 1 )  J_F.K. was assassinated 
we don't need to worry about the extent of its specious present, lest 
our decision prevent some future speaker of ( 1 )  from expressing what 
we expressed. In fact, we simply don't think at all about specious 
presents when using our language. But it is difficult to see how a view 
like Burge's could be true unless speakers of ordinary tensed senten� 
ces frequently engaged in considerations concerning specious presents. 
And it is absurd to suppose that such a complicated selection of 
intervals of time is a process or activity that occurs automatically, or 
without conscious deliberation. Indeed, it is imperative that speakers 
know what the specious present for their sentences is, if they are ever 
to know when they've succeeded in expressing what they or others 
express. 
Although I regard the above considerations as sufficient to subvert 
the view that tenses refer to a specious present, I want to consider 
some additional difficulties facing those who would use it to reconcile 
our original statement ( i )  with (ii)  and (iii). The importance of these 
further problems is that they direct our attention to some fascinating 
and (to my knowledge) hitherto undiscussed features of tenses and 
their role in communication.1 They also provide a further illustration 
of just how far allegiance to (iv) takes us from an accurate account of 
the use of natural languages. 
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III 
The issues I want now to examine can best be intrcx:iuced by consider­
i ng some cases. 
Case 1 :  l am attending a party with my friend Jones, who ( I  happen 
to lc now) has had an extremely exhausting day . At one point I notice 
that Jones is ncx:iding off to sleep in a comfortable chair. Turning to 
my host, I remark, 
( 2 )  Jones is feeling tired 
But suppose that my host is unable to see Jones dozing in the chair. 
Believing him to be well rested, he says to me , 'You must be mis­
taken' .  But I shalce my head and reply, 'Jones is feeling tired' .  
I realize that speakers are rarely so boring as to repeat exactly the 
same words used previously, when trying to express again what they 
earlier expressed. In real life I probably would not have replicated ( 2 )  
exactly i n  response to my host's incredulity. I would instead have 
chosen another sentence to express what I earlier expressed with ( 2 )  
- for example, 'Jones is wiped out' 'Jones is exhausted',  or ( in defer­
ence to my host's ego) ' I  know you seldom err, but Jones is feeling the 
effects of a rough day '.  But apart from this convenient artificiality, we 
have here a paradign case of nonsimultaneous tensed sentences 
· expressing the same thing. In ordinary discourse, of course, that sort 
of agreement seldom occurs simultaneously; people agree with them­
selves or with others on separate occasions. And in the situation we 
are imagining here, it is clear that by replicating ( 2 )  my intention was 
to express what I expressed previously. It is not a case in which I 
wanted merely to report the sentence I had uttered previously, as 
though I might no longer wish to be claiming that Jones is feeling 
tired. If that had been all I wanted to do, it would have been more 
appropriate to say, 'What I said was . . .  ' .  
Case 1 ,  then is just the sort of case which partisans of ( iv'"') believe 
they can explain. Let us say that my first replica of ( 2 )  was produced 
at moment M, and that my later replica was prcx:iuced at M'. Cham­
pions of the specious present would claim that the two replicas of ( 2 )  
express the same thing because they each refer to the same specious 
present, some moment M"' which includes moments M and M'. 
Now an ordinary present-tense sentence 'S is 0' is true just in case 
S is 0, not simply during the interval regarded as the present ( i .e . ,  at 
some time or other during that interval) ,  but throughout the present. 
At the very least this is true of ( 2 )  in this case. In real life, had I 
wanted to express, for example, the more cautious and complicated 
proposition typically expressed by 'Jones is feeling tired at some time 
during the present', I would not have prcx:iuced as simple a sentence 
as ( 2  ). And we may suppose that I had no reason to expect Jones' 
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condition to undergo any sudden or rapid change. Hence, there would 
be no reason for me to say anything more circumspect than 'Jones is 
feeling tired'.  Presumably, then, defenders of ( iv' ) would take the two 
replicas of ( 2 )  to have the same truth-conditions; that is how they 
would explain the fact that the replicas express the same thing. Both 
sentences would be considered true just in case Jones is feeling tired 
throughout M'. 
But now let us suppose that ber� M and M' a powerful amphe­
tamine that Jones had ingested several minutes beforehand suddenly 
takes effect , so that by the time I replicate ( 2 )  at M', Jones is brim­
ming with energy . What truth-values should we then assign to my two 
replicas of 'Jones is feeling tired '? I submit that we should take the 
first replica ( produced at M ,  before Jones feds the effect of the drug) 
to be true, and the second ( produced after Jones' resurgence of 
energy ) to be false. In this case, I think we should say that although I 
expressed the same thing at M and M', nevertheless the sentence I 
produced at M is true, while the sentence I produced at M' is false. In 
this way we can capture what is semantically peculiar about the case, 
while still respecting what seemed initially to be correct about it -
namely, that I expressed at M' what I expressed earlier at M. After all, 
that is what seemed to be obvious about my verbal performance at M' 
before learning about the amphetamine. And I submit that this extra 
bit of information should not alter our assessment of what I expressed 
at M'. Whether or not Jones felt the effect of an amphetamine is 
completely irrelevant to determining whether I expressed at M' what I 
expressed earlier at M. Recall that, ex hypothesi ,  I had no knowledge at 
M and M' that Jones had taken an amphetamine, and so that fact cer­
tainly did not enter into my consideration at those times. 
But notice that we cannot analyze the case this way on the view 
under consideration. According to the view of language embracing ( i )  
and ( iv"'), both replicas o f  ( 2 )  have the same truth-conditions, and 
necessarily, any two sentences having the same truth-conditions have 
the same truth-value. Therefore, by insisting that nonsimultaneous 
tensed sentences express the same thing in virtue of referring to the 
same specious present, this account of tenses and their role in agree­
ment fails to allow for changes in the world to correspond to changes 
in truth-value assignments to tensed sentences. And that difficulty 
seems especially enbarrassing in view of the fact that one of the most 
interesting features of tensed sentences is that most such sentences can 
change in truth-value with time.2 
Case 2: This case should be especially useful for those who can 
detect contradictory sentences more easily than sentences expressing 
the same thing. The scene is later at the party mentioned in case 1 .  
Jones, feeling the effect of the amphetamine, is circulating among the 
guests with great zest and conviviality. During this time, two party­
goers engage in conversation. The first, A, having last seen Jones 
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asleep in the easy chair, and believing him still to be asleep, says to B, 
' Have you seen Jones? ' .  B, having last seen Jones involved in an ani­
mated discussion in the ktichen, and believing him still to be in that 
room, says (at M )  ' Yes. Jones is in the kitchen ' .  A, understandably 
incredulous, and al.so mindful of B's reputation as a practical joker. 
replies 'Jones is noc in the kitchen '. 
Now first of all, this is surely a paradigm case of the occurrence of a 
pair of contradictory sentences in ordinary discourse. For one thing, 
the members of such sentence-pairs are hardly ever produced simul­
taneously. One would think, then, that any remotely adequate analy­
sis of contradictory tensed sentences would not be stymied by the fact 
that they are produced at different times. Interestingly, however. this 
is precisely where the traditional accounts of contradictories go awry. 
To bring their stark artificiality clearly into the open, consider the fol­
lowing additional features of case 2 .  Suppose that when B says 
( 5 )  Jones is in the kitchen 
Jones is in the kitchen but that when A says 
(6)  Jones is not in the kitchen 
Jones had returned to the living room. 
How are we now to understand this case? First of all, I submit that 
knowledge of Jones' whereabouts is irrelevant to determining whether 
( 5 )  and (6)  are contradictories. It is obvious that A is denying what B 
expressed; that was clear before I mentioned where Jones was. But it 
also seems as if each of their sentences is true. Jones is in the kitchen 
when B utters ( 5 ), and is not in the kitchen when A utters ( 6 ). But 
then contrary to the received view of contradictories, it seems as if the 
contradictoriness of ( 5 )  and ( 6 )  is independent of the truth-value 
assignments we make to the sentences. 
It seems ironic that defenders of ( iv"' ) should have difficulty han­
dling nonsimultaneous contradictories. Presumably, they would 
accept the received view that contradictories must have different 
truth-values. And in order to assign opposing truth-values to ( 5 )  and 
( 6 ), they would relativize the sentences' truth-conditions to the same 
specious present M". ( 5 )  would be true, I suppose, just in case Jones 
is in the Kitchen throughout M". But what are the truth-conditions of 
( 6 )? Is ( 6 )  true just in case Jones is not in the kitchen throughoutM"'? 
The problem is that this statement of ( 6 )'s truth-conditions is ambig­
uous. It could be stating the truth conditions of either 
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(6') Jones is not in the kitchen at some time during M' 
(6 ... ) Jones is not in the kitchen at any time during M"' 
Now if ( 5 )  is true just in case Jones is in the kitchen rhroughour M ... , 
then one would think that A's denial of ( 5 )  would have the truth, 
conditions of(6"' ) - i.e., that his sentence (6) has the force of 
( 7)  Jones is in a different room (throughout M"') 
or 
( 8 )  Jones is out of the kitchen ( throughout M"') 
But in that case ( 5 )  and (6) need not have opposite truth,values. In 
fact, if Jones is in the kitchen for only parr of M"', both sentences are 
false. Only if (6) is understood to have the truth-conditions of (6') 
must ( 5 )  and ( 6) have different truth,values. Unfortunately, however, 
this seems to require an arbitrary difference in the way we interpret 
( 5 )  and (6). We don't take ( 5 )  to mean 'Jones is in the kitchen at 
some time during M"' ' . And I submit that it would be suspicious in 
the case described to give (6) the truth--conditions of (6'). (6) does 
seem to have the force of something like (7)  or (8), and the case does 
seem to require that we give parallel analyses of the truth-conditions 
of ( 5 )  and ( 6 ). 
But can it be acceptable, my opponent might wonder, to allow sen­
tences expressing the same thing to differ in truth,value, and to allow 
contradictory sentences to have the same truth,value? I grant that at 
first this might seem like a crazy thing to take as a given about ordi­
nary language, since it seems to call into question much of a 
deservedly well,entrenched theoretical framework in logic. But it 
doesn't seem so outrageous when we reflect that we are dealing with 
nonsimultaneous pairs of sentences. For example, the traditional and 
familiar notion of contradictories applies to sentences abstracted from 
the temporal restrictions placed on their truth-conditions. But then 
there is no reason to expect that this venerable notion of contradicto-­
ries will apply to the richer notion of a iensed sentence. Since tensed 
sentences can be adequately understood only in a temporal context, 
and since they do have their truth,conditions relativized in some way 
to their times of production, it is not surprising that nonsimultaneous 
contradictory tensed sentences can have the same truth,value. A satis­
factory analysis of a tensed natural language simply requires a notion 
of contradictories different from the standard Aristotelian notion. So 
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long as we are concerned with the temporal aspects of language ( a nd 
tensed sentences in partic ular), the concept of contradictories can no 
longer be explai ned in terms of opposing truth-values. M y  suspicion is 
that an adequate notion of contradictories for an analysis of natural 
languages will be (at least partly) pragmatic rather than wholly seman­
tic. Perhaps it will have to be spelled out in terms of such things as 
intentions, presuppositions, or even Gricean implicatures. I am there­
fore, not renouncing our logical framework . Rather, I am suggesting 
only that its application has certain hitherto unacknowledged limita­
tions. Still, it is definitely an e mbarrassment to the standard accounts 
of tenses that they fail to represent these interesting features of 
language. 
Nevertheless, I imagine that few will be easily swayed to my point 
of view. Most will be tempted to try to explain away the anomalous 
situations characterized above rather than scuttle or severely limit the 
use of familiar and otherwise apparently viable logical tools. But I 
think this would be a mistake. In fact, it may succeed only in creating 
additional serious problems. To see why, consider the following chal­
lenge to my remarks about cases 1 and 2 above. 
Some might urge that it was wrong from the start to claim that I 
expressed the same thing both times I uttered 
( 2 )  Jones is feeling tired 
They would contend, quite sensibly , that person B can agree with per­
son A even though A and B do not express the same thing. For exam­
ple, in case 1 ,  some might argue that the respect in which I agree with 
myself when I repeat ( 2 )  is that my later remark abbreviates a sent­
ence like 
(9) Jones was feeling tired then [ i .e . ,  when I 
uttered the first sentence] and still is 
In that case, I would have been uttering an implicit conjunction the 
second time, and the reason my sentence is false at that time is simply 
that the second conjunct is false. 
Now while I agree that some cases of agreement can be handled 
along these lines, many - including case 1 - cannot. First of all, I 
don't think we would have been inclined to understand my sentence 
at M' this way before learning about the change in Jones' condition. 
And remember, ex hypothesi, neither my host not I knew Jones had 
taken an amphetamine. Any my host didn't ask me ( say ) whether 
Jones' condition was stable; he was incredulous about my assessment 
of Jones' present condition. Hence, the correct interpretation of my 
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second sentence is what l think would have been our initial interpreta­
tion - namely, that I expressed about Jones neither more nor less 
than what I expressed earlier. 
Moreover, it is preposterous to claim that people cannot express 
the same thing with nonsimultaneous tensed sentences, simply 
because the sentences are produced at different times. A language with 
that feature would be a failure as a natural language. Human languages 
are presumably designed to facilitate communication, not to force it 
into convoluted patterns satisfying the canons of old-fashioned logical 
analysis. Barring cognitive or linguistic limitations, we can express 
whatever we want, whenever we want. The passage of time imposes 
no limits on what we can express; nor does it limit what we can say 
using the present tense. The passsage of time may, however, deter­
mine what can be said truly. 
Apparently, then, by trying to explain away the odd features of 
cases 1 and 2, we return to the implausible position which earlier 
forced us to consider the view that tenses refer to a specious present. 
The problem with the initial interpretation of ( iv) - i.e.,  (iv') - was 
that it could not help explain how nonsimultaneous tensed sentences 
could express the same thing. We accordingly modified that view by 
understanding the time referred to as a specious present. But that view 
still left it a mystery how speakers could agree on a specious present, 
and it also could not explain how tensed sentences expressing the 
same thing could differ in truth-value, and how contradictory tensed 
sentences could have the same truth-value. And now, in order to 
explain away these interesting (and unheralded) facts of ordinary lan­
guage, proponents of the referential analysis of tenses seem forced to 
retreat back to the deeply unsatisfactory view that nonsimultaneous 
tensed sentences necessarily express different things. 
The view that tenses refer to times thus appears to be far less attrac­
tive than we might have thought initially, and seems to lead to 
extremely implausible descriptions of ordinary discourse. What, then, 
are we to make of the cases thought by many to support the referen­
tial analysis? Let us now turn our attention to that topic. 
IV 
One kind of case apparently supporting a referential analysis of tenses 
is exemplified by Burge's example 
( 3 )  My body is too weak for dancing 
As we observed earlier, ( 3 )  can be used appropriately as a reply not 
only to ' Why aren't you dancing? ' ,  but also to ' Why didn't you 
attend the dance last month?' .  Since ( 3 )  can serve as an answer to this 
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second question, Burge and others conclude that the pre.senc referred 
to in ( 3 )  can extend a month into the past. 
This line of reasoning conceals several mistakes. The first is the 
failure to see that even if ( 3) does implicitly contain a reference to a 
time, we are not compelled to attribute that referring role to its tense 
structure. Since this mistake figures also in another case discussed 
below, I will postpone my comments about it until then. 
A second mistake may simply � the failure to remember that the 
grammatical and semantic tenses of a sentence need not be the same. 
For example, suppose you aslc the grocer about the price of his fruit, 
and he replies, 
( 1 0 )  Those melons will be 89 cents each 
Although this sentence is grammatically inflected in the future tense, 
it is clearly a present-tense sentence semantically. Or suppose I ask 
you, 'What are you doing tomorrow?' ,  and you reply 
( 1 1 )  I 'm flying to Chicago 
Your reply should clearly be understood to be in the future tense, 
even though your sentence is grammatically inflected in the present 
tense ( this particular discrepancy between grammatical and semantic 
tenses is, of course, common in German ). 
Similarly, I suggest that ( 3 )  is not a semantically present-tense sen­
tence, or at least not only a semantically present-tense sentence, as an 
answer to 'Why didn't you attend the dance last month?' .  In that case 
( 3 )  might plausibly be understood as equivalent to one of the 
following. 
( 1 2 )  My body was too weak for dancing and still is 
( 1 3 )  My body is often (or is usually) too weak for dancing 
( 1 2 )  is a conjunction of a past- and present-tense sentence, and ( 1 3  ), 
whose principal temporal operator is ' It is often ( or usually) that case 
that . . .  ' ,  clearly has truth-conditions more complicated than those for a 
simple present-tense sentence. 
In any event, that ( 1 2 )  and ( 1 3 )  are indeed plausible translations of 
( 3 )  in this case reminds us that what a sentence expresses is partly a 
function of the way it is embedded in a bit of life. That is why we can 
know what a sentence expresses only after knowing certain facts about 
the sentence's context of production. That is also why many sentences 
of ordinary language can be paraphrased in certain contexts by longer 
and more explicit sentences. Hence, when Elmer Fudd says 'She 
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waved at him', he might be expressing what those of us who can pro­
nounce the letter 'r' would express ·with 'She raved at him'. Cases of 
irony or sarcasm furnish somewhat more relevant examples. Thus, in 
some contexts, 'That was an interesting remark' might express what 
one would more straightforwardly express with 1That was a dull 
remark'. Finally, to take a case similar to Surge's dancing example, 
suppose I ask you, 'Why did Professor Jones tty to burn down his 
elementary school when he was 8 years old?' and you reply 
( 14) He did it because he is crazy 
Presumably, the grammatically present-tense 'he is crazy' in ( 14) 
abbreviates something like 'he has always been crazy' or 'he has been 
crazy for a long time'. This is perhaps clearer still when we reflect on 
the oddity of answering 'Why didn't Professor Jones help his class­
mates burn down the school when he was 8 years old?' with 
( 1 5 )  He is very mature 
A different sort of case, purportedly supporting a referential analy­
sis of tenses, is the following. This case is supposed to show that 
tenses can refer to rather specific times. Suppose I ask you, 'Why 
diqn't Mary attend last week's party?', and you reply by saying 
( 16) Mary was sick 
Burge and others have maintained that the past tense in ( 16) refers to 
a specific time in the past - namely, the time of the party. If ( 16) 
were true just in case Mary is sick at some time or other prior to ( 16 )'s 
production, then it could be true even though Mary was not sick at 
the time of the party. But in that case ( 16)  would not be a proper 
reply to the question. Thus, we are told, ( 16) is best understood as 
equivalent to 
( 16') Mary was sick then 
where the demonstrative 'then' is understood to refer to the time of 
the party. 
But in neither this case nor the case of ( 3) must we suppose that 
some (possibly covert) feature of a sentence's tense structure is refer­
ring to a time, simply because that sentence abbreviates another sent­
ence containing explicit temporal references. The equivalence of ( 16) 
and ( 16') in certain situations does not suggest that something in the 
tense structure of ( l6) is doing the job of 'then' in ( 16'). Rather, it 
suggests simply that in those contexts the explicit use of 'then' is 
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unnecessary. The reason we can economize and utter ( 1 6 )  is because 
in context it is clear what we are saying. Given the background of 
shared presuppositions required for the occur-rence of ( 1 6 )  to be 
intelligible and appropriate in the conversational context we are con­
sidering, an explicit reference in ( 1 6 )  to the rime of the parry would 
be gratuitous. The study of the suppression of the demonstrative in 
( 1 6')  thus seems to be a matter for the pragmatic analysis of conversa­
tional contexts, rather than the semantic analysis of tenses. 
Context, then, often supplies information which we can omit from 
our overt pronouncements without hindering communication. Pro­
ponents of referential analyses of tenses apparently overlook this vital 
fact in some cases, and in so doing, attribute more structure to our 
language than it actually has. 
v 
We see, then, that despite our refusal to attribute a referring role to 
tenses, we can still plausibly account for the familiar linguistic epi­
sodes in which this role is allegedly manifest. But denying that tenses 
refer has serious and far-reaching consequences for the philosophy of 
language. We can best see this by considering first just what tenses 
apparently do, given that they do not refer. 
My position on the matter is that tenses are nothing more than very 
general sorts of restrictions placed on sentences' truth-conditions. 
They determine the very general respect(s) in which a sentence's truth 
conditions are relativized to its rime of production.3 For example, 
generally speaking a past-tense sentence of the form 'S was 0' is true 
j ust in case S is 0 prior to its time of production [ the sentence to the 
right of the biconditional is tenseless]. When a sentence ' S was 0' 
abbreviates a sentence 'S was 0 at t ' ,  then the sentence is true if and 
only if S is 0 at t and t is before the sentence's rime of production. 
But in such a case it is not the tense of the sentence that is responsible 
for the increased specificity of these truth-conditions. What is respon­
sible is the modifier 'at t ' ,  the explicit production of which may be 
unnecessary in that context. The past tense of 'S was 0' merely 
imposes a certain general kind of temporal restriction on the senten­
ce's truth-conditions. For the sentence to be true, what it reports 
must occur before its time of production, rather than after or at that 
time, as in the case of the future and present tenses, respectively. 
Of course, in making general claims about tenses and tensed sent­
ences, some abstracting from the intricacies of ordinary discourse is 
inevitable. In fact, the truth-conditions of tensed sentences are rarely 
this straightforward. For example, 'Jones is sick' and 'Jones is smiling' 
might differ in truth-conditions in virtue of the sorts of beliefs about 
being sick and smiling we presuppose in discourse. Consider: 
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how long m ust Jones be in some appropriately abnormal state for a 
replica of 'Jones is sick' to be true? One would imagine al lease as long 
as the sentence's { presumably rather brief) time of production. But if 
Jones' condition Lasts only that long, we might be reluctant to say that 
he was sick. On the other hand, Jones might smile only during the 
sentence's time of producton, and that would be sufficient for an 
ordinary instance of 'Jones is smiling' to be true. But these complica­
tions in the truth-conditions of tensed sentences are due to pragmatic 
presuppositions about being sick and smiling. As in the case of sup­
pressed specific references to times, they are not complications in the 
sentences' tense structure. 
According to this non-referential account of tenses, therefore, 
although the tense of a sentence determines how the sentence's truth­
conditions are relativized to its time of production - that is, whether 
what the sentence reports must occur before, during, or after its time 
of production { or more complicated sorts of relationships as in the 
case of compound tenses) - this is not accomplished by means of 
covert references to times made in the sentences. Granted, in stating a 
tensed sentence's truth-conditions we refer to moments of time. But 
truth-conditions are expressed in a meta-language, and the level of 
abstraction at which we state a sentence's truth-conditions is far 
removed from the everyday contexts in which object-language senten­
ces are usually produced. The statement of a sentences's truth­
conditions deals with the way that sentence functions within a certain 
linguistic context, and there is no reason whatever to insist that every 
temporal reference in the metalinguistic statement of a tensed senten­
ce's truth-conditions corresponds to some temporal reference in the 
associated object-language sentence. Hence, tenses are not like the re­
ferring singular terms ' now' and 'then', which typically refer to times 
in object-language sentences. But once we grant this, we must 
seriously reconsider other widely-held views about language. 
To begin with, we have seen that nonsimultaneous replicas of a 
tensed sentence can have different truth-conditions but express the 
same thing. For example, successive replicas of 
( 1 )  J . F.K. was assassinated 
produced at moments M and M', can express the same thing, as we 
know from ordinary discourse. But the replica produced at M is true 
j ust in case J.F.K. is assassinated before M, while the later replica is 
true j ust in case J .F.K. is assassinated before M'. Thus the period of 
time in which J .F.K. must be assassinated for a replica of ( 1 )  to be 
true changes from M to M'. In this respect, the replicas of ( 1 )  have 
different truth-conditions. But while this change appears minimal, it is 
nevertheless significant, since it is this variability of truth-conditions 
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which enables the replicas to differ m truth,value - for example, 
when J .F .K .  is assassinated sometime between M andM'. In any case, 
since replicas of ( 1 )  expressing the same thing can differ in truth, 
conditions, we must abandon the familiar view that a change in a 
sentence's truth-conditions determines a corresponding change in 
what it expresses 
Taking a non,referential approach to tenses may also force us to 
reconsider another of the familiar views about propositions menti, 
oned at the beginning of this paper - namely, that propositions have 
truth,values. We know from ordinary Language use that nonsimul, 
taneous replicas of a tensed sentence like ( 1 )  can express the same 
thing. But we also know that these replicas have different truth, 
conditions and can differ in truth,value. But what about the proposi, 
tions they express? If the sentences express the same proposition, and 
if propositions have truth,values, then we would presumably be in the 
awkward position of claiming that a true and a false sentence can both 
express the same true (or false) proposition. We also saw that pairs of 
contradictory sentences can have the same truth,value. What do we 
say about this? Do contradictory tensed sentences express contradic, 
tory propositions? If so, and if contradictory propositions have 
opposing truth,values (as one would expect), then if two false senten, 
ces (say) are contradictories, one of these false sentences will express a 
true proposition. 
The peculiarity of these claims is perhaps not reason enough for 
rejecting the view that propositions have truth,values. It may be intel, 
ligible to say (for example) that a false sentence can express a true 
proposition (though I doubt it). But once we grant (say) that contra, 
dictory sentences can have the same truth,value, it is far from clear 
that there is anything to be gained by assigning truth,values to the 
things sentences express. So long as we continue to maintain that a 
sentence is true when its truth,conditions are satisfied, then the truth, 
conditions of sentences would not be correlated in any straightfor, 
ward way with the truth,conditions of the propositions which the 
sentences express. We would, in fact, have to provide two theories of 
truth, one for sentences, and another for propositions. And the latter, 
it appears, would be implausibly independent of the former. 
l suppose some might argue that the need for two such theories of 
truth is precisely what we should expect. After all, they might say, 
since a sentence is a kind of linguistic a1enc, and since what a sentence 
expresses is not, why should we expect to be able to correlate their 
truth,conditions in any neat way - if, indeed, they may be correlated 
at all? In fact, we should remember that propositions have tradition, 
ally been regarded as language,independent in some significant 
respect. That is why philosophers have wanted to say, for example, 
that the proposition that 7 is a prime number is true whether or not 
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I shall not attempt to resolve this issue here. Even so, we can at 
least see that a decision in favor of treating propositions as ttuth­
bearers will not restore our familiar account of the relationship 
between sentences and propositions, since on the traditional account 
sentences have the same truth,value as the propositions they express. 
Often, on these accounts, sentences are taken to have truth-values 
derivately, rather than primitively. That is, propositions are regarded 
as the primary truth-bearers, and sentences are true or false only 
insofar as they express true or false propositions, respectively. But 
this approach turns on the plausibility of the view that a change in a 
sentence's truth-conditions determines a corresponding change in 
proposition expressed - a view which I have tried to show in unte, 
nable. lf my observations about tenses and their role in agreement are 
correct, then, we have persuasive reasons for abandoning this picture 
of the relationship between sentential and propositional truth-value. 
Indeed, we have grounds for rethinking seriously the concept of a 
proposition. If propositions, the things sentences express, are not the 
sorts of things that have truth,values, what kinds of things are they? 
Here, we come to one of the deeper issues lurking beneath the surface 
of this paper; let me comment on it briefly. I suggest that we should 
not take too literally the pre-theoretical intuition that sentences 
express things (whether or not we call these things (propositions'), or 
that a sentence means something. Although these are very natural 
ways to describe what sentences do, they foster the illusion that the 
successful use of a sentence does some thing which we can then des­
cribe in a reasonably exhaustive or complete way. Although l cannot 
defend the view here, I suggest that the meaning of (or proposition 
expressed by) a sentence is no more clearly or exhaustively specifiable 
than would be the humor or sensitivity of a sentence ... How a sentence 
is humorous or sensitive can be roughly and incompletely specified by 
choosing some description of the context in which the sentence is 
produced. But little more can be said about what a sentence means or 
expresses. We can offer some description of the context in which the 
sentence is produced, and thereby point to certain features of its use 
- e.g., how it is a response to what preceded it, what effect it pro­
duced, etc. But such accounts are fated to be incomplete, and ulti­
mately no more precise than the bit of language they are intended to 
explicate. We can say what a sentence means or expresses only by 
producing another sentence, and at no point can we fall back on a bit 
of language whose meaning is any more precisely explicable than the 
one we wanted to explain initially. 
But if it is a mistake to suppose that what a sentence expresses is 
exact or clearly specifiable, then perhaps one reason nonsimultaneous 
replicas of a tensed sentence can so easily express the same thing is 
36
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 17 [1986], No. 1, Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol17/iss1/3
78 Stephen E. Braude 
that sentences generally do not express something precise. The convo­
luted attempts examined earlier to explain how tensed sentences can 
express the same thing OT contradict one another ( e.g. , by means of 
reference to the same specious present) are simply examples of the 
sort of theorizing one tends to engage in by supposing that natural 
languages are kinds of calculi, more or less precise vehicles for com­
municating. Of course, philosophers have for some time been arguing 
that this general approach to language is deeply mistaken. The forego­
i ng discussion is merely an attempt to make the same point in a dif­
ferent way.5  
Notes 
1 Buridan comes to di.scussing them in his Sophisms (my cases are modeled after 
so� o( those he presents - see Scott, 1 966 ). But Buridan resolutely refuses to 
abandon the traditional concept of contradictories, as well as the view that tenses 
refer. He also seems to embrace the view that we use tenses to refer to a specious 
present (see, e.g .• chapt. 7, sophism 3 ). 
2 Contrary to what some have believed, not all tensed sentences can change in 
truth-value with time. See Braude, 1973.  
1 See Braude, 1 97 3  for an explanation of this position from a somewhat different 
point of view. 
• For a good defense of this view, see Goldberg, 1 982. Also, Braude, 1 979: 1 52-
1 74, 205££. 
� I am grateful to many people for stimulating and helpful discussions of this 
topic, and for criticisms of ancestors of this paper. ln particular I wish to thank 
Bruce Goldberg, Scott Weinstein, Alan Tormey, Tyler Burge, and Steven Davis. 
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